Theory and Decision

, Volume 69, Issue 4, pp 523–536 | Cite as

Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom

  • André CasajusEmail author


We provide another characterization of the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure without the additivity axiom.


Owen value Additivity Marginality Differential marginality 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IMW Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielfeldGermany
  2. 2.Chair of Economics and Information SystemsHHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany
  3. 3.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche FakultätUniversität LeipzigLeipzigGermany

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