Theory and Decision

, Volume 65, Issue 4, pp 339–353

Delay in a bargaining game with contracts



In a multilateral bargaining game where a proposer and responders can set up a “principal–agent” relationship by means of binding cash-offer contracts, we show that there is a Markov SPE with a delay in reaching an agreement. We also show that all the individually rational and efficient payoffs can be supported by SPE.


Game theory Multilateral bargaining Delay Contracts 

JEL Classification

C72 C78 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA
  2. 2.Institute of EconomicsAcademia SinicaTaipeiTaiwan, Republic of China
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsNational University of SingaporeSingaporeSingapore

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