Theory and Decision

, Volume 67, Issue 3, pp 295–301 | Cite as

A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums

Article

Abstract

We give a characterization of majority voting rules with quorums in the framework of May (Econometrica 20:680–684, 1952)’s seminal article. According to these voting rules, an alternative is socially chosen if and only if it obtains the relative majority of votes and the total number of voters not abstaining reaches the quorum.

Keywords

Voting rules Majority voting rules with Quorums 

JEL Classification

D71 

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References

  1. Côrte Real P., Pereira P.: The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, representation and abstention. Social Choice and Welfare 22(2), 349–369 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Fishburn, P. C. (1973). The theory of social choice. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Houy N.: Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules. Mathematical Social Sciences 53(1), 111–121 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. May K.O.: A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions. Econometrica 20, 680–684 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS – Laboratoire d’EconométrieEcole PolytechniqueParisFrance

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