The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games
- 204 Downloads
Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.
Keywordsevolution of language evolutionary game theory signaling games
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Barrett, J.A. (2006), Numerical simulations of the Lewis signaling game: learning strategies, pooling equilibria, and the evolution of grammar, UC Irvine Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences Preprint (22 2006). http://www.imbs.uci.edu/tr/abs/2006/mbs06_09.Google Scholar
- Lewis D. (1969) Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University PressGoogle Scholar
- Huttegger, S. (2007a), Evolution and the explanation of meaning, Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar
- Huttegger, S. (2007b), Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives, Erkenntnis.Google Scholar
- Skyrms B. (1996) Evolution of the social contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
- Skyrms B. (2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
- Skyrms, B. (2006), Signals Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA 2006.Google Scholar