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Theory and Decision

, Volume 67, Issue 2, pp 223–237 | Cite as

The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games

Article

Abstract

Signaling games with reinforcement learning have been used to model the evolution of term languages (Lewis 1969, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Skyrms 2006, “Signals” Presidential Address. Philosophy of Science Association for PSA). In this article, syntactic games, extensions of David Lewis’s original sender–receiver game, are used to illustrate how a language that exploits available syntactic structure might evolve to code for states of the world. The evolution of a language occurs in the context of available vocabulary and syntax—the role played by each component is compared in the context of simple reinforcement learning.

Keywords

evolution of language evolutionary game theory signaling games 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Logic and Philosophy of ScienceUC IrvineIrvineUSA

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