Theory and Decision

, Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 121–151 | Cite as

Better May be Worse: Some Monotonicity Results and Paradoxes in Discrete Choice Under Uncertainty

  • Jörgen W. Weibull
  • Lars-Göran Mattsson
  • Mark Voorneveld
Article

Abstract

It is not unusual in real-life that one has to choose among finitely many alternatives when the merit of each alternative is not perfectly known. Instead of observing the actual utilities of the alternatives at hand, one typically observes more or less precise signals that are positively correlated with these utilities. In addition, the decision-maker may, at some cost or disutility of effort, choose to increase the precision of these signals, for example by way of a careful study or the hiring of expertise. We here develop a model of such decision problems. We begin by showing that a version of the monotone likelihood-ratio property is sufficient, and also essentially necessary, for the optimality of the heuristic decision rule to always choose the alternative with the highest signal. Second, we show that it is not always advantageous to face alternatives with higher utilities, a non-monotonicity result that holds even if the decision-maker optimally chooses the signal precision. We finally establish an operational first-order condition for the optimal precision level in a canonical class of decision-problems, and we show that the optimal precision level may be discontinuous in the precision cost.

Keywords

decision theory discrete choice monotonicity uncertainty 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jörgen W. Weibull
    • 1
  • Lars-Göran Mattsson
    • 2
  • Mark Voorneveld
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsStockholm School of EconomicsStockholmSweden
  2. 2.Department of Transport and EconomicsRoyal Institute of TechnologyStockholmSweden
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsStockholm School of EconomicsStockholmSweden
  4. 4.Department of Econometrics and Operations ResearchTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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