Individually Rational Collective Choice
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There is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individual choices. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I characterize rationalizable collective choices.
Keywordscollective choice consumer choice individual rationality random utility revealed preference
JEL Classification NumbersD70 D74 D12
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