Abstract
This paper connects two notions: Hart and Mas-Colell’s ‘potential’, related to the value of coalitional games, and Coleman’s earlier notion of ‘power of a collectivity to act’, related to the easiness to make decisions by means of a voting rule.
Key words
voting rules potential simple gamesJel Classifications
C71 D7Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
- Banzhaf, J. 1965Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysisRutgers Law Review19317343Google Scholar
- Calvo, E., Santos, J. C. 1997Potentials in cooperative TU-gamesMathematical Social Science34175190CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Calvo, E., Santos, J. C. 2000Weighted weak semivaluesInternational Journal of Game Theory2919CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Coleman, J. S. 1971Control of Collectivities and the power of a collectivity to actLieberman, B. eds. Social ChoiceGordon and BreachLondonGoogle Scholar
- Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A. 1989Potential, value and consistencyEconometrica57589614Google Scholar
- Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F. 2002Potential, value and probabilityDepartamento de Economía Aplicada IV, Basque Country UniversityBilbao, SpainDiscussion Paper 27/2002Google Scholar
- Laruelle, A., Valenciano, F. 2005Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situationsSocial Choice and Welfare24171197CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Shapley, L. S. 1953A Value for n-Person gamesAnnals of Mathematical Studies28307317Google Scholar
- Shapley, L. S., Shubik, M. 1954A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee systemAmerican Political Science Review48787792Google Scholar
Copyright information
© Springer 2005