In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness.
Keywordsunanimity rule resource monotonicity simple Pareto path independence strategy-proofness
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Barberà, S., Sonnenschein, H., Zhou, L. 1991Voting by committeesEconometrica59595609Google Scholar
- Chun, Y., Thomson, W. 1988Monotonicity Properties of Bargaining solutions when applied to economicsMathematical Social Sciences151127Google Scholar
- Gordon, S. 2001Solidarity Conditions and Unanimity Rules in Attribute-Based Domains: A CharacterizationNorthwestern UniversitymimeoGoogle Scholar
- May, K.O. 1952A set of independent necessary and Sufficient conditions for simple majority decisionEconometrica20680684Google Scholar
- Moulin, H. 1987Egalitarian Equivalent cost-sharing of a public goodEconometrica55963977Google Scholar
- Plott, C.R. 1973Path independence, rationality, and social choiceEconometrica4110751091Google Scholar
- Thomson, W. 1994Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peakedSocial Choice and Welfare11205223Google Scholar
- Thomson, W. 2001Monotonic Allocation Rules: A SurveyUniversity of RochestermimeoGoogle Scholar