Theory and Decision

, Volume 59, Issue 1, pp 1–17 | Cite as

Unanimity and Resource Monotonicity



In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness.


unanimity rule resource monotonicity simple Pareto path independence strategy-proofness 


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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe University of KansasLawrenceU.S.A.

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