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Theory and Decision

, Volume 57, Issue 1, pp 5–24 | Cite as

A Comparison of Some Distance-Based Choice Rules in Ranking Environments

  • Hannu Nurmi
Article

Abstract

We discuss the relationships between positional rules (such as plurality and approval voting as well as the Borda count), Dodgson’s, Kemeny’s and Litvak’s methods of reaching consensus. The discrepancies between methods are seen as results of different intuitive conceptions of consensus goal states and ways of measuring distances therefrom. Saari’s geometric methodology is resorted to in the analysis of the consensus reaching methods.

Keywords

Borda count Dodgson’s method Geometry of voting Kemeny’s rule Litvak’s median Positional procedures Social choice 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hannu Nurmi
    • 1
  1. 1.Academy of Finland, Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuTURKUFinland

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