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Telecommunication Systems

, Volume 52, Issue 2, pp 623–632 | Cite as

Stock provisioning strategies for QoS at the interdomain level

  • Dominique Barth
  • Loubna EchabbiEmail author
  • Chahinez Hamlaoui
Article
  • 70 Downloads

Abstract

Some interdomain traffic needs specific guarantees in terms of QoS. Hence, an end-to-end QoS provisioning should be maintained by transit Autonomous Systems and final destinations proposing the services. We propose a distributed stock model following a reverse cascade negotiation in order to enable QoS provisioning at the interdomain level. We analyze different stock strategies on a simple network topology using game theory framework and validate our results by simulation.

Keywords

Interdomain services QoS provisionning Nash equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dominique Barth
    • 1
  • Loubna Echabbi
    • 2
    Email author
  • Chahinez Hamlaoui
    • 3
  1. 1.PRiSMUniversité de VersaillesVersaillesFrance
  2. 2.INPTMadinat Al IrfaneRabatMorocco
  3. 3.Orange Labs (France Telecom, R&D)Issy Les Moulineaux Cedex 9France

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