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I defend the claim that we have the capacity to perceptually represent objects and events in experience as deviating from an expectation, or, for short, as deviant. The rival hypothesis is that we may ascribe the property of deviance to a stimulus at a cognitive level, but that property is not a representational content of perceptual experience. I provide empirical reasons to think that, contrary to the rival hypothesis, we do perceptually represent deviance.
KeywordsPerception Perceptual content Rich content view Philosophy of mind
I would like two thank two anonymous referees at this journal, both of whom were thoughtful, prompt, and kind. I also owe debts to Sam Carter and Mia Accomando for extensive and invaluable feedback. Finally, I must express my deepest gratitude to two Susannas: Susanna Schellenberg, who provided essential feedback during this paper’s development; and Susanna Siegel, without whose work on the contents of perception this paper would never have existed.
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