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Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge

  • Chris DragosEmail author


I connect two increasingly popular ideas in social epistemology—group knowledge and epistemic extension—both departures from mainstream epistemological tradition. In doing so, I generate a framework for conceptualizing and organizing contemporary epistemology along several core axes. This, in turn, allows me to delineate a largely unexplored frontier in group epistemology. The bulk of extant work in group epistemology can be dubbed intra-group epistemology: the study of epistemically salient happenings within groups. I delineate and attempt to motivate what I dub inter-group epistemology: the study of epistemically salient happenings between groups and other subjects and entities.


Group knowledge Epistemic autonomy Collective epistemology Social epistemology Epistemology of groups Epistemic dependence 



I thank Sandy Goldberg, Brad Wray, Boaz Miller, Jeroen de Ridder, Haixin Dang, Georgi Gardiner, Mike Ashfield, and two anonymous referees at Synthese for helpful comments on various ancestors of this paper. I also thank organizers and participants at the 2016 University of Tartu Graduate Conference in Social Epistemology, the 2016 University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Melon Graduate Philosophy Conference, the Social Epistemology colloquium of the 2017 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, the Social Epistemology colloquium of the 2017 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, the 2017 Social Epistemology Research Group (SERG) and Network on Epistemology and Society (EpiSoc) Summer School in Social Epistemology, and two work-in-progress talks at the University of Toronto’s Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ryerson UniversityTorontoCanada

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