pp 1–35 | Cite as

Twelve great papers: comments and replies. Response to a special issue on logical perspectives on science and cognition—The philosophy of Gerhard Schurz

  • Gerhard SchurzEmail author
S.I.: LogPerSciCog


This is a response to the papers in the special issue Logical Perspectives on Science and CognitionThe Philosophy of Gerhard Schurz.


Defeasible normative reasoning Theory-ladenness Causality Meta-induction Scoring rules Truth-tracking Truthlikeness Truthmaker paradox 



  1. Adams, E. W. (1998). A primer of probability logic. Stanford: CSLI Publications.Google Scholar
  2. Asch, S. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity I. Psychological Monographs 70/9.Google Scholar
  3. Balzer, W., Moulines, C. U., & Sneed, J. D. (1987). An architectonic for science. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
  4. Cartwright, N. (1999). Causal diversity and the Markov condition. Synthese, 121(1/2), 3–27.Google Scholar
  5. Cevolani, G., Crupi, V., & Festa, R. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories. Erkenntnis, 75(2), 183–202.Google Scholar
  6. Cevolani, G., & Festa, R. (2009). Scientific change, belief dynamics and truth approximation. La Nuova Critica, 51(52), 27–59.Google Scholar
  7. Elqayam, S., Thompson, V. A., Wilkinson, M. R., Evans, J. S. B. T., & Over, D. E. (2015). Deontic introduction: A theory of inference from is to ought. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 41, 1516–1532.Google Scholar
  8. Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  9. Hawkins, D. I., et al. (2004). Consumer behavior (9th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
  10. Heys, W., & Winkler, R. (1970). Statistics: Probability, inference, and decision (Vol. I). New York: Holt.Google Scholar
  11. Hilpinen, R. (1976). Approximate truth and truthlikeness. In M. Przelecki, K. Szaniawski, & R. Wojcicki (Eds.), Formal methods in the methodology of empirical sciences (pp. 19–42). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  12. Kuipers, T. A. F. (1982). Approaches to descriptive and theoretical truth. Erkenntnis, 18, 343–378.Google Scholar
  13. Kuipers, T. (2016). Models, postulates, and generalized nomic truth approximation. Synthese, 193(10), 3057–3077.Google Scholar
  14. Leitgeb, H. (2004). Inference on the low level. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  15. Leitgeb, H. (2017). The stability of belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Makinson, D. (1965). The paradox of the preface. Analysis, 25(6), 205–207.Google Scholar
  17. Miller, D. (1978). On the distance from the truth as a true distance. In J. Hintikka, et al. (Eds.), Essays on mathematical and philosophical logic (pp. 166–177). Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
  18. Milne, P. (2005). Not every truth has a truthmaker. Analysis, 65, 221–224.Google Scholar
  19. Näger, P. M. (2013). Causal graphs for EPR experiments. Retrieved from
  20. Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  21. Oddie, G. (1986). Likeness to truth. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  22. Oddie, G. (2013). The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude. Synthese, 190(9), 1647–1687.Google Scholar
  23. Oddie, G. (2016). Truthlikeness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy.
  24. Prior, A. N. (1960). The autonomy of ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38, 199–206.Google Scholar
  25. Raven, B., & Rubin, J. Z. (1983). Social psychology. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
  26. Reichenbach, H. (1938). Experience and prediction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  27. Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific explanation and the causal structure of the world. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Schippers, M., & Schurz, G. (2018). Genuine confirmation and tacking by conjunction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (online-first).
  29. Schurz, Ch. (2015). Contextual-hierarchical reconstructions of the strengthened liar problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44, 517–550.Google Scholar
  30. Schurz, G. (1983). Wissenschaftliche Erklärung. Graz: dbv Verlag.Google Scholar
  31. Schurz, G. (1991). Relevant deduction. Erkenntnis, 35, 391–437.Google Scholar
  32. Schurz, G. (1997). The is-ought problem: An investigation in philosophical logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  33. Schurz, G. (2002). Ceteris paribus laws: Classification and deconstruction. Erkenntnis, 57(3), 351–372.Google Scholar
  34. Schurz, G. (2004). Normic laws, nonmonotonic reasoning, and the unity of science. In S. Rahman, et al. (Eds.), Logic, epistemology, and the unity of science (pp. 181–211). Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
  35. Schurz, G. (2008). The meta-inductivist’s winning strategy in the prediction game: A new approach to Hume’s problem. Philosophy of Science, 75(3), 278–305.Google Scholar
  36. Schurz, G. (2010). Non-trivial versions of Hume’s is-ought thesis and their presuppositions. In C. R. Pigden (Ed.), Hume on “is” and “ought” (pp. 198–216). London: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
  37. Schurz, G. (2011). Verisimilitude and belief revision. With a focus on the relevant element account. Erkenntnis, 75(2), 203–221.Google Scholar
  38. Schurz, G. (2012). Meta-Induction in epistemic networks and social spread of knowledge. Episteme, 9(2), 151–170.Google Scholar
  39. Schurz, G. (2014a). Philosophy of science: A unified approach. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  40. Schurz, G. (2014b). Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 45, 87–96.Google Scholar
  41. Schurz, G. (2014c). Criteria of theoreticity: Bridging statement and non statement view. Erkenntnis, 79(8), 1521–1545.Google Scholar
  42. Schurz, G. (2015a): Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie [transl.: probabilty theory]. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.Google Scholar
  43. Schurz, G. (2015b). Ostensive learnability as a test criterion for theory-neutral observation concepts. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 46(1), 139–153.Google Scholar
  44. Schurz, G. (2017). Interactive causes: Revising the Markov condition. Philosophy of Science, 84(3), 456–479.Google Scholar
  45. Schurz, G. (2018). Truthlikeness and approximate truth. In J. Saatsi (Ed.), Routledge handbook of scientific realism (pp. 133–148). Oxford: Routledge.Google Scholar
  46. Schurz, G. (2019a). Hume’s problem solved: The optimality of meta-induction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  47. Schurz, G. (2019b). Impossibility results for rational belief. Noûs, 53(1), 134–159.Google Scholar
  48. Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets. Synthese, 193(4), 1073–1103.Google Scholar
  49. Schurz, G., & Hertwig, R. (2019). “Cognitive Success”. Topics in Cognitive Science (online first).
  50. Schurz, G., & Lambert, K. (1994). Outline of a theory of scientific understanding. Synthese, 101(1), 65–120.Google Scholar
  51. Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (1987). Verisimilitude defined by relevant consequence-elements. In T. A. F. Kuipers (Ed.), What is closer-to-the-truth? (pp. 47–77). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  52. Schurz, G., & Weingartner, P. (2010). Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude. Synthese, 172, 415–436.Google Scholar
  53. Shalev-Shwartz, S., & Ben-David, S. (2014). Understanding machine learning. From theory to algorithms. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  54. Tichý, P. (1976). Verisimilitude redefined. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 27, 25–42.Google Scholar
  55. Van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  56. Wilson, N. (2013). An order of magnitude calculus. Retrieved from
  57. Zwart, S. D., & Franssen, M. (2007). An impossibility theorem for verisimilitude. Synthese, 158(1), 75–92.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Duesseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceHeinrich Heine University DuesseldorfDuesseldorfGermany

Personalised recommendations