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A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism

  • Mahmoud MorvaridEmail author


Several lines of reasoning have been proposed to show the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism. In this paper I examine two such lines of reasoning, which both rely on the general idea that since content externalism is incompatible with certain aspects of the alleged privileged character of self-knowledge, it would tend to undermine justification internalism as well. I shall argue that both lines of reasoning, as they stand, lack plausibility, though the core idea of the second line can be reconstructed into a new argument which shows considerable promise. In particular, relying upon the reliability constraint on knowledge, I shall argue that the so-called ‘two-concept’ version of content externalism is incompatible with ‘the transparency of sameness of content’, and thereby would also undermine justification internalism.


Content externalism Justification internalism Privileged self-knowledge Transparency of sameness of content Transparency of difference of content 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Analytic PhilosophyInstitute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)TehranIran

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