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Synthese

pp 1–13 | Cite as

Composition as identity: pushing forward

  • Einar Duenger BohnEmail author
S.I. : Mereology and Identity
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Abstract

In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity (CAI) as I think it should be understood (Sects. 1, 2), and reply to some objections to it (Sects. 3, 4). My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.

Keywords

Composition as identity Mereology Identity Plural properties 

Notes

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of AgderKristiansandNorway

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