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Synthese

pp 1–32 | Cite as

Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology

  • Stephen Biggs
  • Jessica WilsonEmail author
S.I.: New Directions in the Epistemology of Modality

Abstract

How should modal reasoning proceed? Here we compare abduction-based and conceiving-based modal epistemologies, and argue that an abduction-based approach is preferable, and by a wide margin.

Keywords

Modal epistemology Conceiving Abduction Theoretical virtues A priority Semantic indeterminacy Kant Carnap 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank David Alexander, Ranpal Dosanjh, Benj Hellie, Antonella Mallozzi, Elanor Taylor, participants at the 2018 APA symposium on inference to the best explanation, and this journal’s anonymous referees, for helpful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyIowa State UniversityAmesUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Toronto (St. George and Scarborough)TorontoCanada

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