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On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience

  • Jonathan MitchellEmail author


Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also show that by accepting this thesis we can explain relevant features of evaluative understanding.


Non-conceptual Content Affective Evaluative Conceptual 



I am thankful to Peter Poellner, Hemdat Lerman, two anonymous reviewers from Synthese, and to audiences at University of Bath, University of Liege, and University of Warwick, for their constructive criticism and comments on previous versions of the paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK
  2. 2.KenilworthUK

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