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The hybrid contents of memory

  • André Sant’AnnaEmail author


This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project.


Memory Representationalism Relationalism Relational content Memorial content Particularity 



I’m grateful to three anonymous referees and the editor for helpful comments and suggestions made to previous drafts of the paper. I’m also grateful to Kirk Michaelian, Andrew Moore, Cathy Legg, Chloe Wall, Ligia Coutes, Denis Perrin, and Bill Fish for reading and commenting on previous drafts of the paper. I’m also indebted to audiences at the University of Otago and at the University of Cologne for discussions on previous versions of this material.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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