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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 4, pp 1209–1224 | Cite as

Introduction: primitivism versus reductionism about the problem of the unity of the proposition

  • Manuel García-CarpinteroEmail author
  • Bjørn Jespersen
S.I.: Unity of Structured Propositions
  • 172 Downloads

Abstract

We present here the papers selected for the volume on the Unity of Propositions problems. After summarizing what the problems are, we locate them in a spectrum from those aiming to provide substantive, reductive explanations, to those with a more deflationary take on the problems.

Keywords

Propositions Representational acts Unity of propositions Predication 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Financial support was provided by the DGI, Spanish Government, research project FFI2016-80588-R, and through the award “ICREA Academia” for excellence in research, 2013, funded by the Generalitat de Catalunya (Manuel García-Carpintero); Grant Agency of the Czech Republic Project No. GA18-23891S (Bjørn Jespersen). We would like to express our immense gratitude to the referees who helped us tremendously in selecting the papers for this volume and ensuring that the arguments in them acquired their strongest shape, and to the journal’s main editors during this process, Gila Sher and Wiebe van der Hoek, for their help and support. Thanks to John Collins, Richard Gaskin, Peter Pagin, Michele Palmira, Bryan Pickel, Indrek Reiland, François Recanati, and two anonymous referees for comments on a previous version of this introduction, and to Michael Maudsley for his grammatical revision.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS, Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceTechnical University of OstravaOstravaCzech Republic

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