What does robustness teach us in climate science: a re-appraisal
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In the philosophy of climate science, debate surrounding the issue of variety of evidence has mostly taken the form of attempting to connect these issues in climate science and climate modeling with philosophical accounts of what has come to be known as “robustness analysis.” I argue that an “explanatory” conception of robustness is the best candidate for understanding variety of evidence in climate science. I apply the analysis to both examples of model agreement, as well at to the convergence of evidence from both model and non-model sources.
KeywordsClimate science Climate models Robustness Explanation Emergent constraints
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