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Belief, credence, and evidence

  • Elizabeth JacksonEmail author


I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view focuses on the possibilities that the evidence makes salient. I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts.


Belief Credence Evidence Rationality Lottery paradox Statistical evidence Salience 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA

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