The difference between epistemic and metaphysical necessity
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Philosophers have observed that metaphysical necessity appears to be a true or real or genuine form of necessity while epistemic necessity does not. Similarly, natural necessity appears genuine while deontic necessity does not. But what is it for a form of necessity to be genuine? I defend an account of genuine necessity in explanatory terms. The genuine forms of necessity, I argue, are those that provide what I call necessitarian explanation. I discuss the relationship of necessitarian explanation to ground.
KeywordsNecessity Genuine Explanation Ground Open future
My thanks to Selim Berker, Harjit Bhogal, Dave Chalmers, Cian Dorr, Kit Fine, Matthew Hanser, Marc Lange, Kris McDaniel, Carla Merino-Rajme, Jessica Moss, Asya Passinsky, Zee Perry, Gideon Rosen, Erick Sam, Erica Shumener, Ted Sider, Sharon Street, Michael Strevens, Jennifer Wang and to audiences at NYU, Iowa State University, Koç University, Ashoka University and the APA Pacific Division Meeting.
I am grateful for the support of the John Templeton Foundation and of the Program of Postdoctoral Fellowships at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
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