The imprecise impermissivist’s dilemma
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Impermissivists hold that an agent with a given body of evidence has at most one rationally permitted attitude that she should adopt towards any particular proposition. Permissivists deny this, often motivating permissivism by describing scenarios that pump our intuitions that the agent could reasonably take one of several attitudes toward some proposition. We criticize the following impermissivist response: while it seems like any of that range of attitudes is permissible, what is actually required is the single broad attitude that encompasses all of these single attitudes. While this might seem like an easy way to win over permissivists, we argue that this impermissivist response leads to an indefensible epistemology; permissive intuitions are not so easily co-opted.
KeywordsUniqueness Permissivism Bayesianism Ranged credence
We are grateful to Jennifer Carr, Kenny Easwaran, Brian Hedden, James Joyce, Ben Schwan, Reuben Stern, Olav Vassend, participants at the 2016 meeting of the Wisconsin Philosophical Association, the 2016 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, and the 2017 Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and two anonymous referees. We are especially grateful to William Roche and Michael Titelbaum for extensive feedback.
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