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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 4, pp 1595–1622 | Cite as

Continuity of change in Kant’s dynamics

  • Michael Bennett McNultyEmail author
Article

Abstract

Since his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft was first published in 1786, controversy has surrounded Immanuel Kant’s conception of matter. In particular, the justification for both his dynamical theory of matter and the related dismissal of mechanical philosophy are obscure. In this paper, I address these longstanding issues and establish that Kant’s dynamism rests upon Leibnizian, metaphysical commitments held by Kant from his early pre-Critical texts on natural philosophy to his major critical works. I demonstrate that, throughout his corpus and inspired by Leibniz, Kant endorses the a priori law of continuity of alteration as a truth of metaphysics, according to which all alterations in experience must occur gradually through all intervening degrees. The principle thus legislates against mechanical philosophy’s absolutely impenetrable atoms, as they would would involve instantaneous changes of velocity in impact. This reveals the metaphysical incoherencies in mechanical philosophy and leaves Kant’s own dynamical theory of matter, grounded on material forces, as the only viable approach to physical explanation. Subsequently, I demonstrate that Kant nevertheless made conceptual space in his system for the theoretical consideration of mechanical explanations, which makes manifest one of the positive roles that the faculty of reason can play with respect to natural science.

Keywords

Immanuel Kant Matter Dynamics Continuity Mechanical philosophy Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 

Notes

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the \(11{\mathrm{th}}\) International History of Philosophy of Science Conference. I thank the audience as well as my symposium co-presenters, Katherine Dunlop and Marius Stan, for their questions and comments. Sean Greenberg and Don Rutherford also provided me with helpful information on the dissemination of Leibniz’s dynamic theory. I am especially grateful to Tim Jankowiak for discussing Kant’s views on continuity with me, offering detailed feedback on the paper, and allowing me to read his draft manuscript examining Kant’s proofs of the law of continuity. Finally, the recommendations of two anonymous referees at Synthese greatly improved my argumentation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Minnesota, Twin CitiesMinneapolisUSA

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