pp 1–14

Reflections on new thinking about scientific realism

S.I. : New Thinking about Scientific Realism


In August 2014 the Universities of Pretoria and Johannesburg hosted a major international conference in Cape Town, ‘New Thinking about Scientific Realism’, to assess extant discussions of the view in hopes of opening up new avenues of research, and to sow the seeds of further development and consideration of these prospective lines of inquiry. In this, the concluding essay of the Special Issue collecting some of the descendants of these earlier presentations, I extract some of the more striking themes to emerge with the aim of reflecting on their novelty and their promise for the future study of scientific realism.


Scientific realism Selective realism Pessimistic induction Mathematical realism Scientific representation Axiological realism Approximate truth Epistemic stances 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Notre DameNotre DameUSA

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