, Volume 195, Issue 9, pp 4031–4045 | Cite as

Ignorance of ignorance

  • Kit Fine


I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.


Knowledge Ignorance Indeterminacy Contingency Modal logic Fitch’s paradox 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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