, Volume 195, Issue 9, pp 3837–3856 | Cite as

Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways

  • Wolfgang SpohnEmail author
S.I. : Epistemic Justification


Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete success.


Epistemic reasons Justification Apriority Objectivity Pragmatic theory of truth Rationality Ranking theory 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of KonstanzKonstanzGermany

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