, Volume 195, Issue 8, pp 3651–3683 | Cite as

Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic

  • Xuefeng Wen


Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens the theoretical boundaries of judgment aggregation by proving that, even if these nonmonotonic logics are employed, certain typical impossibility results still hold.


Judgment aggregation Nonmonotonic logic General logic Logical consequence Group decision Social choice 



I thank the three anonymous referees for their critical and suggestive comments, which help to improve the paper greatly. I would like to give special thanks to my colleague Hao Tang for his careful proof-reading of the paper and elaborate comments on my English writing. This work was supported by China National Social Science Foundation (No. 14ZDB015), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 13wkpy71), and the “Three Big Constructions” of Sun Yat-sen University. The first draft of this paper was finished when I was a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley. Thanks to Wesley Holliday for inviting me.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of PhilosophySun Yat-sen UniversityGuangzhouChina

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