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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 6, pp 2217–2241 | Cite as

Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders

  • Ginger A. HoffmanEmail author
S.I.: Psych&Phil
  • 174 Downloads

Abstract

In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders (what I call “collective disorders”—disorders of groups rather than individuals) in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible with key metaphysical commitments of contemporary scientific psychiatry, and argue that if one accepts the existence of mental disorders in individuals as medical, then one has good reasons to accept the existence of collective disorders as medical. First, I outline how collective disorders are reconcilable with both the harmful dysfunction model of disorder and a denial of mind-body dualism. I then identify some potential weaknesses in the main pre-existing example of a collective disorder, offering my own examples as supplements. These examples’ medical plausibility is bolstered by: (1) work in philosophy of biology on the generalized selected effects theory of function (largely from Justin Garson), and (2) work in analytic philosophy of mind on collective mentality (largely from Bryce Huebner). Finally, after offering preliminary responses to the objection that the recognition of collective disorders may lead to an overpathologization of everyday life, I spell out ways in which this recognition may have empowering effects for some would-be patients; for example, by providing substance to the notion of a “sane response to an insane world.”

Keywords

Collective illness Relational disorder Biological function Mental illness Collective mind Group mind Sanism Neurodiversity Harmful dysfunction Extended mind 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I sincerely thank Justin Garson, Bhob Rainey, Şerife Tekin, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySaint Joseph’s UniversityPhiladelphiaUSA

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