, Volume 195, Issue 3, pp 1065–1075 | Cite as

Intersubstitutivity principles and the generalization function of truth

  • Anil GuptaEmail author
  • Shawn Standefer
S.I.: Minimalism about Truth


We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich’s response to the Liar paradox—more specifically, of his move to preserve classical logic. Horwich’s response requires that the full intersubstitutivity of ‘ ‘A’ is true’ and A be abandoned. It is thus open to the objection, due to Hartry Field, that it undermines the generalization function of truth. We defend Horwich’s move by isolating the grade of intersubstitutivity required by the generalization function and by providing a new reading of the biconditionals of the form “ ‘A’ is true iff A.”


Truth Paradox Minimalism Deflationism Revision theory Paul Horwich Hartry field 



We are grateful to the editors, Joseph Ulatowski and Cory Wright, and particularly to an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on our paper. Standefer’s acknowledgement: This research was supported by the Australian Research Council, Discovery Grant, DP150103801.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.University of MelbourneParkvilleAustralia

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