, Volume 195, Issue 4, pp 1681–1703 | Cite as

Prioritised ceteris paribus logic for counterfactual reasoning

  • Patrick Girard
  • Marcus A. Triplett


The semantics for counterfactuals due to David Lewis has been challenged by appealing to miracles. Miracles may skew a given similarity order in favour of those possible worlds which exhibit them. Lewis responded with a system of priorities that mitigates the significance of miracles when constructing similarity relations. We propose a prioritised ceteris paribus analysis of counterfactuals inspired by Lewis’ system of priorities. By analysing the couterfactuals with a ceteris paribus clause one forces out, in a natural manner, those possible worlds which do not satisfy the requirements of the clause, thus excluding miracles. If no world can satisfy the ceteris paribus clause in its entirety, then prioritisation is triggered to select worlds that maximise agreement on those things which are favoured most.


Ceteris paribus Counterfactuals Conditional logic 



We wish to thank the participants at the Australasian Association of Logic and the Analysis, Randomness and Applications meetings held in New Zealand in 2014. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at TARK XV and we wish to thank the participants for helpful suggestions on improving the paper. We also wish to thank Sam Baron, Andrew Withy, Balder ten Cate and the anonymous referees for valuable comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand
  2. 2.University of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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