Act theories and the attitudes
- 162 Downloads
Theories of propositions as complex acts, of the sort recently defended by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames, make room for the existence of distinct propositions which nonetheless represent the same objects as having the same properties and standing in the same relations. This theoretical virtue is due to the claim that the complex acts with which propositions are identified can include particular ways of cognizing, or referring to, objects and properties. I raise two questions about this sort of view—one about what it means to stand in a propositional attitude relation to a complex act of this sort, and one about which ways of cognizing can be parts of propositions. Both questions turn out to be difficult for the complex act theorist to answer in a satisfactory way.
KeywordsPropositions Unity Acts
- Caplan, B., Tillman, C., McLean, B., & Murray, A. (2014). Not the optimistic type. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43(5–6), 575–589.Google Scholar
- Soames, S. (2012). What is meaning?. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
- Soames, S. (2014). Cognitive propositions. In New thinking about propositions (pp. 91–125). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Speaks, J. (ms.). Complex acts and the unity of the proposition.Google Scholar