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Synthese

, Volume 195, Issue 1, pp 287–319 | Cite as

Why warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments

  • Thomas LockhartEmail author
Article
  • 185 Downloads

Abstract

Epistemological disjunctivists (such as Duncan Pritchard and John McDowell) make appeal to Moorean-style anti-skeptical arguments. It is often held that one problem with using Moorean-style arguments in the context of a response to skepticism is that such arguments are subject to a kind of epistemic circularity. The specific kind of epistemic failure involved has come to be known as a failure of warrant transmission. It would likely pose a problem for the anti-skeptical ambitions of the epistemological disjunctivist if his version of the Moorean-style argument failed to transmit warrant; but no epistemological disjunctivist has offered an argument to show that this is not so. In this paper, I fill the gap by arguing that warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments.

Keywords

Warrant transmission Neo-Moorean Epistemological disjunctivism Wright Pritchard McDowell Skepticism 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on this paper. Thanks also to Jennifer Lockhart for endless invaluable conversations on this material.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Auburn UniversityAuburnUSA

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