, Volume 196, Issue 4, pp 1369–1383 | Cite as

Propositions as Cognitive Acts

  • Scott SoamesEmail author
Unity of Structured Propositions


The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational metaphysical and epistemological advantages over other theories. It then answers a leading objection to the theory, before closing by raising the issue of how questions, which are the contents of interrogative sentences, and directives, which are the contents of imperative sentences, are related to propositions.


Propositions Predication First-person cognition Present-tense cognition Linguistic cognition Perceptual cognition Recognition of recurrence Frege’s puzzle Representationally identical but cognitively distinct propositions Millian modes of representation 


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Southern CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

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