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Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 11, pp 4597–4621 | Cite as

Belief and certainty

  • Dylan DoddEmail author
Article

Abstract

I argue that believing that p implies having a credence of 1 in p. This is true because the belief that p involves representing p as being the case, representing p as being the case involves not allowing for the possibility of not-p, while having a credence that’s greater than 0 in not-p involves regarding not-p as a possibility.

Keywords

Belief Credence Certainty Subject sensitive invariantism Probability operators Lottery Paradox Defeasibility Epistemology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PortlandPortlandUSA

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