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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 1, pp 127–144 | Cite as

Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will

  • Laura W. EkstromEmail author
S.I.: Real Possibilities, Indeterminism and Free Will

Abstract

For those who maintain that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, a persistent problem is to give a coherent characterization of action that is neither determined by prior events nor random, arbitrary, lucky or in some way insufficiently under the control of the agent to count as free action. One approach—that of Roderick Chisholm and others—is to say that a third alternative is for an action to be caused by an agent in a way that is not reducible to event causal terms. A different approach than the Chisholmian appeal to primitive substance causation is one that, instead, involves causal relations purely among events. This paper presents a particular event-causal indeterminist account of free action, describing both its attractions and recent objections to it, and then proposes a revised version, with the aim of supporting the plausibility of an event-causal indeterminist approach to free will.

Keywords

Event-causal libertarianism Indeterminism Causation Necessitation Agency Self-direction Free will 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe College of William & MaryWilliamsburgUSA

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