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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 1, pp 179–200 | Cite as

Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination

  • Ruth GroffEmail author
S.I.: Real Possibilities, Indeterminism and Free Will

Abstract

I argue that realism about causal powers (which, loosely following Brian Ellis, I refer to as ‘anti-passivism’) sublates the passivist, Humean-inflected free will problematic. In the first part of the paper I show that adopting what I call ‘powers-non-determinism’ reconfigures the conceptual terrain with respect to the causation component of the contemporary problematic. In part two I show how adopting ‘powers-non-determinism’ significantly alters the nature of the discussion with respect to the agency component of the problematic. In part three I compare ‘powers-non-determinism’ to an otherwise- Humean agent causal position.

Keywords

Powers p-non-determinism Agency Free will Causation Compatibilism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Louis UniversitySt. LouisUSA

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