, Volume 194, Issue 6, pp 2007–2024

What reasoning might be


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1034-z

Cite this article as:
Valaris, M. Synthese (2017) 194: 2007. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1034-z


The philosophical literature on reasoning is dominated by the assumption that reasoning is essentially a matter of following rules. This paper challenges this view, by arguing that it misrepresents the nature of reasoning as a personal level activity. Reasoning must reflect the reasoner’s take on her evidence. The rule-following model seems ill-suited to accommodate this fact. Accordingly, this paper suggests replacing the rule-following model with a different, semantic approach to reasoning.


Reasoning Inference Rule-following John Broome  Paul Boghossian Epistemic possibility 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

Personalised recommendations