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Synthese

, Volume 196, Issue 1, pp 87–103 | Cite as

A paradox concerning Frankfurt examples

  • Ishtiyaque HajiEmail author
S.I.: Real Possibilities, Indeterminism and Free Will

Abstract

The set with the following members is inconsistent: F-Lesson: A person can be blameworthy for performing an action even though she cannot refrain from performing it. Equivalence: ‘Ought not’ is equivalent to ‘impermissible.’ OIC: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and ‘ought not’ implies ‘can refrain from.’ BRI: Necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if it is overall morally impermissible for one to do it. Since Equivalence seems unassailable, one can escape the inconsistency by renouncing any one of the other members. I first argue against BRI and then motivate a replacement for it that ties blameworthiness to belief in impermissibility.

Keywords

Blameworthiness Frankfurt examples Impermissibility Luck Obligation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for their comments and suggestions. This paper was written during my tenure of a fellowship awarded by the Calgary Institute for the Humanities (CIH) at the University of Calgary. I’m grateful to the CIH for its generous support.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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