, Volume 194, Issue 5, pp 1643–1662 | Cite as

Epistemology versus non-causal realism

  • Jared WarrenEmail author
Original Research


This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument—non-causal realism—and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss and respond to several possible responses to the argument. In addition to clearing up and avoiding numerous misunderstandings of arguments of this kind that are quite common in the literature, this paper aims to present and endorse a rigorous and fully general epistemological argument against realism.


Epistemological arguments against realism Reliability challenge Realism Epistemology 


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.JacksonvilleUSA

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