Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 5, pp 1565–1590 | Cite as

Why follow the royal rule?

Article
  • 159 Downloads

Abstract

This note is a sequel to Huber (Synthese 191:2167–2193, 2014). It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.

Keywords

Counterfactuals Conditional belief Modal idealism Ranking functions Royal rule Tracking 

References

  1. Adams, E. W. (1970). Subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Foundations of Language, 6, 89–94.Google Scholar
  2. Adams, E. W. (1975). The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  3. Bigaj, T. (2006). Non-locality and possible worlds: A counterfactual perspective on quantum entanglement. Frankfurt: Ontos.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Briggs, R. (2009). The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance. Synthese, 167, 81–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Bennett, J. (2003). A philosophical guide to conditionals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  7. Collins, J., Hall, N., & Paul, L. A. (2004) (Eds.), Causation and counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Cross, C. B. (2008). Antecedent-relative comparative world similarity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37, 101–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Edgington, D. (2008). Counterfactuals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108, 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Field, H. (1978). A note on Jeffrey conditionalization. Philosophy of Science, 45, 361–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Goldszmidt, M., & Judea, J. P. (1996). Qualitative probabilities for default reasoning, belief revision, and causal modeling. Artificial Intelligence, 84, 57–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Herzberger, H. G. (1979). Counterfactuals and consistency. Journal of Philosophy, 76, 83–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Hild, M. (1998). Auto-epistemology and updating. Philosophical Studies, 92, 321–361.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Hild, M., & Spohn, W. (2008). The measurement of ranks and the laws of iterated contraction. Artificial Intelligence, 172, 1195–1218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Huber, F. (2006). Ranking functions and rankings on languages. Artificial Intelligence, 170, 462–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Huber, F. (2007). The consistency argument for ranking functions. Studia Logica, 86, 299–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Huber, F. (2013). Structural equations and beyond. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 6, 709–732.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Huber, F. (2014). New foundations for counterfactuals. Synthese, 191, 2167–2193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Huber, F. (2015a). How to Learn concepts, consequences, and conditionals. Analytica, 1, 20–36.Google Scholar
  20. Huber, F. (2015b). What should I believe about what would have been the case? Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44, 81–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. James, W. (1896). The will to believe. In F. Burkhardt, F. Bowers, & I. Skrupskelis (Eds.), The will to believe and other essays in popular philosophy (pp. 291–341). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  22. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The logic of decision (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  23. Lewis, D. K. (1973a). Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  24. Lewis, D. K. (1973b). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556–567.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs, 13, 455–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Lewis, D. K. (1980). A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance. In R. C. Jeffrey (Ed.), Studies in inductive logic and probability (Vol. II, pp. 263–293). Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press. Reprinted with Postscripts in D. Lewis (1986), Philosophical papers (Vol. II, pp. 83–132). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  27. Lewis, D. K. (1986a). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  28. Lewis, D. K. (1986b). Introduction. In D. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical papers II (pp. ix–xvii). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  29. Lewis, D. K. (1994). Humean supervenience debugged. Mind, 103, 473–490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Moore, G. E. (1942). A reply to my critics. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore (pp. 535–677). La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
  31. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Pettigrew, R. (2013). A new epistemic utility argument for the principal principle. Episteme, 10, 19–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Roush, S. (2005). Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Shenoy, P. P. (1991). On Spohn’s rule for revision of beliefs. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 5, 149–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 141–154.Google Scholar
  36. Spohn, W. (1988). Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In W. L. Harper & B. Skyrms (Eds.), Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics II (pp. 105–134). Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Spohn, W. (2012). The laws of belief. Ranking theory and its philosophical applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Spohn, W. (2013). A ranking-theoretic Approach to conditionals. Cognitive Science, 37, 1074–1106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Spohn, W. (2015). Conditionals: A unifying ranking-theoretic perspective. Philosophers’ Imprint, 15, 1–30.Google Scholar
  40. Stalnaker, R. C. (1968). A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in Lry. American philosophical quaterly (Vol. 2, pp. 98–112). Monograph series. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  41. Vineberg, S. (2000). The logical status of conditionalization and its role in confirmation. In N. Shanks & R. B. Gardner (Eds.), Logic, probability and science. Poznan studies in the philosophy of the science and humanities (Vol. 71, pp. 77–94). Amsterdam: Rodopi.Google Scholar
  42. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

Personalised recommendations