Replacing recipe realism
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Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with ‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.
KeywordsScientific realism Selective realism Pessimistic induction
A version of this paper was presented at New Thinking about Scientific Realism conference in Cape Town. I would like to thank the audience. Special thanks to Steven French.
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