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Synthese

, Volume 194, Issue 9, pp 3233–3244 | Cite as

Replacing recipe realism

  • Juha Saatsi
S.I.: New Thinking about Scientific Realism

Abstract

Many realist writings exemplify the spirit of ‘recipe realism’. Here I characterise recipe realism, challenge it, and propose replacing it with ‘exemplar realism’. This alternative understanding of realism is more piecemeal, robust, and better in tune with scientists’ own attitude towards their best theories, and thus to be preferred.

Keywords

Scientific realism Selective realism Pessimistic induction 

Notes

Acknowledgments

A version of this paper was presented at New Thinking about Scientific Realism conference in Cape Town. I would like to thank the audience. Special thanks to Steven French.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of LeedsLeedsUK

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