, Volume 193, Issue 10, pp 3347–3362 | Cite as

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

  • Michaelis MichaelEmail author


Priest and others have presented their “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic: that only paraconsistent logics allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. This is a very prevalent argument; occurring as it does in the work of many relevant and more generally paraconsistent logicians. However this argument can be shown to be unsuccessful. There is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of non-triviality. Disambiguated the most telling reason for paraconsistent logics is either question-begging or mistaken. This highlights an important confusion about the role of logic in our development of our theories of the world. Does logic chart good reasoning or our commitments? We also consider another abductive argument for paraconsistent logics which also is shown to fail.


Philosophy of logic Classical logic Challenges to classical logic 



Thanks are due to Aislinn Batstone, Wylie Breckenridge, John P. Burgess, Adam Dickerson, Lloyd Humberstone, Toby Meadows, Marcus Rossberg, Max Rabie, and Lionel Shapiro. I would also like to thank and acknowledge the comments of anonymous referees.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Humanities and LanguagesThe University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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