Synthese

, Volume 195, Issue 4, pp 1397–1426 | Cite as

The metaphysics of natural kinds

S.I. : Causation in Metaphysics
First Online:
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Accepted:

Abstract

This paper maps the landscape for a range of views concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically committed views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed.

Keywords

Natural kinds Metaphysics Ontology Universals Essentialism Realism 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to audiences at the Inland Northwestern Philosophy Conference 2008, at the University of Idaho, the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society’s annual conference 2008 in Kichberg am Wechsel, the University of Sheffield, the Cambridge Serious Metaphysics group, Saint Louis University, the University of Melbourne, the University of Sydney, the Australian National University, IHPST in Paris, the Metaphysics of Science conference in Nottingham 2009, and the Metaphysics of Science conference at Kyung Hee University, South Korea in 2010, as well as to anonymous referees for Synthese.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BristolBristolUK

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