Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 12, pp 3961–3977 | Cite as

Robustness and reality

S.I. : Understanding Through Modeling
First Online:
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Accepted:

Abstract

Robustness is often presented as a guideline for distinguishing the true or real from mere appearances or artifacts. Most of recent discussions of robustness have focused on the kind of derivational robustness analysis introduced by Levins, while the related but distinct idea of robustness as multiple accessibility, defended by Wimsatt, has received less attention. In this paper, I argue that the latter kind of robustness, when properly understood, can provide justification for ontological commitments. The idea is that we are justified in believing that things studied by science are real insofar as we have robust evidence for them. I develop and analyze this idea in detail, and based on concrete examples show that it plays an important role in science. Finally, I demonstrate how robustness can be used to clarify the debate on scientific realism and to formulate new arguments.

Keywords

Robustness Ontology Justification Scientific realism Wimsatt 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the (five) anonymous referees of this journal, whose insightful and detailed comments were extremely useful in improving the manuscript. I am also very grateful to the following individuals for their helpful comments on earlier drafts: Hugh Desmond, James DiFrisco, Harmen Ghijsen, Chris Kelp, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Jani Raerinne, Paul Teller, and Raphael van Riel, as well as audiences at Ruhr University Bochum, University of Groningen, and KU Leuven. I especially thank Jan Heylen and Laura Bringmann for their very constructive and helpful feedback on several versions of the paper. The research resulting in this paper was funded by the Research Foundation Flanders—FWO (Postdoctoral Fellowship).

Compliance with ethical standards

Ethical standard

The research resulting in this paper was funded by the Research Foundation Flanders–FWO (Postdoctoral Fellowship).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Analytical Philosophy, Institute of PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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