, Volume 193, Issue 6, pp 1667–1680 | Cite as

Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form

  • Jack Woods


I discuss Greg Restall’s attempt to generate an account of logical consequence from the incoherence of certain packages of assertions and denials. I take up his justification of the cut rule and argue that, in order to avoid counterexamples to cut, he needs, at least, to introduce a notion of logical form. I then suggest a few problems that will arise for his account if a notion of logical form is assumed. I close by sketching what I take to be the most natural minimal way of distinguishing content and form and suggest further problems arising for this route.


Cut/transitivity Restall Assertion/denial Logical form Logical consequence 



Thanks to Catharine Diehl, Nissim Francez, Nick Stang, and two anonymous (and helpful!) referees for useful discussion. Thanks also to John Burgess for remarks on a distant ancestor of this paper and Jimmy Martin for a conversation about it that I reckon he’s forgotten.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bilkent UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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