, Volume 192, Issue 9, pp 3011–3036 | Cite as

Lost memories and useless coins: revisiting the absentminded driver

  • Wolfgang SchwarzEmail author


The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision problem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between “halfing” and “thirding” as well as that between “evidential” and “causal” decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solutions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance.


Causal decision theory Evidential decision theory Diachronic rationality Mixed strategies Deliberation Sleeping Beauty 



Ancestors of this paper were presented at the ANU in 2007 and at the Formal Epistemology Workshop in Munich in 2012. I thank the audiences on these occasions, as well as Alma Barner, Rachael Briggs, Kenny Easwaran, Alan Hájek, Daniel Nolan, Michael Titelbaum, David Wiens, and three anonymous referees for comments and discussion.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language SciencesThe University of EdinburghEdinburghUK

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