Synthese

, Volume 192, Issue 5, pp 1559–1580

Many worlds: decoherent or incoherent?

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0650-8

Cite this article as:
Dawid, R. & Thébault, K.P.Y. Synthese (2015) 192: 1559. doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0650-8

Abstract

We claim that, as it stands, the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett approach to quantum theory is conceptually incoherent. This charge is based upon the approach’s reliance upon decoherence arguments that conflict with its own fundamental precepts regarding probabilistic reasoning in two respects. This conceptual conflict obtains even if the decoherence arguments deployed are aimed merely towards the establishment of certain ‘emergent’ or ‘robust’ structures within the wave function: To be relevant to physical science notions such as robustness must be empirically grounded, and, on our analysis, this grounding can only plausibly be done in precisely the probabilistic terms that lead to conceptual conflict. Thus, the incoherence problems presented necessitate either the provision of a new, non-probabilistic empirical grounding for the notions of robustness and emergence in the context of decoherence, or the abandonment of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett programme for quantum theory.

Keywords

Quantum mechanics Decoherence Emergence Probability  Everett interpretation Many worlds 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Munich Center for Mathematical PhilosophyLudwig Maximilians UniversitätMunichGermany

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