One obstacle faced by proposals of retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics is the perceived high conceptual cost of making such a proposal. I assemble here a metaphysical picture consistent with the possibility of retrocausality and not precluded by the known physical structure of our reality. This picture employs two relatively well-established positions—the block universe model of time and the interventionist account of causation—and requires the dismantling of our ordinary asymmetric causal intuition and our ordinary intuition about epistemic access to the past. The picture is then built upon an existing model of agent deliberation that permits us to strike a harmony between our causal intuitions and the fixity of the block universe view. I conclude that given the right mix of these reasonable metaphysical and epistemological ingredients there is no conceptual cost to such a retrocausal picture of quantum mechanics.
KeywordsRetrocausality Temporal symmetry Interventionism Quantum mechanics Bell’s theorem
Peter W. Evans wishes to thank Sam Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Huw Price, Mikey Slezak and two anonymous referees for Synthese for helpful discussions and comments. This research has been supported partly by the Australian Research Council and the Scholarship for Research on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics at the Centre for Time, University of Sydney and partly by the Templeton World Charity Foundation grant: The causal power of information in a quantum world at the University of Queensland.
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