, Volume 194, Issue 1, pp 163–184 | Cite as

Carnapian rationality

  • A. W. Carus


It is generally thought that Carnap’s principle of tolerance cannot be integrated into a coherent overall conception of rationality. The doubts come from many sides, of which two are singled out. This paper argues (and documents) that both are wrong, and that Carnapian rationality is a viable and perhaps quite interesting program for further development.


Carnap’s principle of tolerance Carnap’s inductive logic Quine Rationality Instrumental rationality Kantian ethics Carnap’s meta-philosophy 



The unpublished texts listed above are quoted by permission of the University of Pittsburgh and the Carnap heirs, respectively, which is gratefully acknowledged. I am also grateful to Georg Schiemer for organizing the conference at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy in July 2013 where an earlier version of this paper was presented, as well as to Thomas Uebel, Florian Steinberger, Pierre Wagner and two anonymous referees for perceptive comments that greatly improved the paper. The influence of many conversations with Howard Stein and Michael Friedman on the overall viewpoint of the paper is pervasive.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.ChicagoUSA

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